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Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential postprocessing step in quantum key distribution (QKD) for removing
any information an eavesdropper may have on the final secret key. In this paper, we consider delaying PA of
the final key after its use in one-time pad encryption and prove its security. We prove that the security and the
key generation rate are not affected by delaying PA. Delaying PA has two applications: it serves as a tool for
significantly simplifying the security proof of QKD with a two-way quantum channel, and also it is useful in
QKD networks with trusted relays. To illustrate the power of the delayed PA idea, we use it to prove the security
of a qubit-based two-way deterministic QKD protocol which uses four states and four encoding operations.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.85.032308 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] allows two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to share a secret key by exchanging
quantum particles. The final secret key is secure against
any eavesdropper, called Eve, with unlimited computational
power. Initial security proofs of QKD mostly focus on infinite
key size and perfect equipment [3–10]. More recent security
proofs take into consideration device imperfection [11–16];
while the effect of finite key size is explicitly considered in
Refs. [17–23].
QKD protocols usually involve two postprocessing steps
after the quantum state transmission step: error correction (EC)
[24] to make sure Alice’s key is the same as Bob’s and privacy
amplification (PA) [25,26] to ensure Eve does not have any
nontrivial information on the final secret key. The final secret
key generated can then be used in a subsequent cryptographic
application such as the one-time pad (OTP) [27,28].
In this paper, we consider running QKD without imme-
diately running EC and PA. Assuming that the OTP will be
used as the next step, we delay the application of EC and PA
until after the OTP, in effect performing a weakly secure OTP.
Delaying EC is trivial and requires no extra attention since
errors in the original key simply translate into the same errors
in the OTP-encrypted message, and bit errors do not affect the
security of the message. On the other hand, delaying PA is
nontrivial since normal PA ensures a key becomes secure first
before being used, and now we use the insecure key first before
making it secure. These two operations do not appear to be
commuting, but we will prove that they do when we choose an
appropriate PA scheme. By commuting, we mean that delayed
PA is secure with the same security level achieved by the
same PA function used to make the original raw key secure. In
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summary, we prove that delaying PA after the OTP does not
affect the security and the key generation rate. Delayed PA is
the focus of the paper.
At first glance, delaying PA does not appear to be of much
use. However, after a more thorough thought, we find that
it is useful on at least two occasions. First, it is useful in the
secret key sharing between nodes in a QKD network where the
nodes do not have a direct quantum link with each other but are
separately connected to a common trusted relay. QKD is run
between each node and the intermediate trusted relay, without
running the full QKD postprocessing. Some postprocessing
such as EC and PA may be delayed1 until two nodes decide to
share a key together, in which case these postprocessing steps
are run only between them. This is particularly useful when
the classical communication, computation, and/or energy costs
associated with the trusted relay are high, for example, as
in satellite-based QKD [29]. Thus, delaying some costly
postprocessing parts can be beneficial. In this paper, we do
not discuss the trusted relay scenario but only the validity of
delaying PA in a general manner. Delaying EC is more trivial
since any two parties each holding a bit string can remove
errors between their strings by exchanging error syndromes
with each other.
The second situation where delayed PA is useful is that we
can use it to construct a two-way deterministic QKD protocol
(DQKD) [30–38], whose security against general attacks is
fully proved in this paper. A two-way deterministic QKD
protocol is a prepare-and-measure protocol in which each
signal (in our case, a qubit) makes a round trip from Bob to
Alice and back to Bob. In contrast to conventional qubit-based
QKD such as the BB84 protocol [1], the correct measurement
basis is always used in DQKD because the signals are both
prepared and measured by Bob. To encode a key bit, Alice
simply applies some operation (based on her key bit value) on
1Investigation of the possibility of delaying basis reconciliation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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the qubit sent by Bob and then returns it back to Bob. Bob can
decode Alice’s key bit by a measurement in the same basis
as what he used to prepare the initial qubit. We remark that
two-way DQKD with continuous variables has been shown to
have the potential for enhancing the security threshold [39].
Delayed PA may serve as a tool for proving the security of
two-way continuous-variable QKD. In this paper, we focus on
qubit-based two-way DQKD.
The security of qubit-based two-way DQKD had been a
long-standing problem until our recent security proof of it [40].
There, we directly compute the overall density matrix of Alice,
Bob, and Eve for one particular two-way DQKD protocol in
which Alice uses two operators for the encoding of her bit.
In this paper, we consider a different qubit-based two-way
DQKD protocol in which Alice uses four encoding operators
and prove its security using the delayed PA idea. We show
that this particular protocol resembles the integration of the
BB84 protocol and the OTP. Because of this, our analysis
is significantly simplified since the security of the DQKD
protocol against general attacks will then directly derive from
that of the BB84 protocol [6–10,12] and the OTP [28]. We
simply rely on the security results of the latter. Our proof idea
is to convert the integrated scheme to the DQKD protocol
through a series of equivalent protocols. We remark that the
idea of integrating QKD with the OTP has been proposed
before by Deng and Long [35] without a rigorous security
analysis. The scheme of Deng and Long runs in a batch-after-
batch manner where a batch of qubits received by Alice on the
BB84 channel is stored in quantum memory first before they
are used as a batch for the OTP encryption, in contrast to our
scheme in which each qubit is returned to Bob immediately
after reception by Alice.
The organization of the paper is as follows: After reviewing
some preliminaries in Sec. II, we first prove the security of
delayed PA in Sec. III. This will be an important tool that we
will use in the conversion to the DQKD protocol. The DQKD
protocol is described in Sec. IV, and the detailed discussion
of its security proof based on the conversion argument is
explained in Sec. V. To begin the conversion, we outline the
initial protocols of the conversion process in Sec. V A. Then
we discuss the conversion process in Sec. V B. We conclude
in Sec. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Bit strings are represented as vectors with elements in
GF(2), where GF(q) is the Galois field with q elements. We
use k to denote such a vector and k[i] to denote the ith bit. We
define the projector function P (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉〈φ|. We denote the
Pauli matrices by
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, Y = iXZ,
and the corresponding eigenstates by {|0w〉,|1w〉}, where w ∈
{x,y,z}.
B. Security measure
We adopt the universal composability definition of security
first proposed by Canetti [41]. This definition quantifies
the security of a cryptographic primitive in terms of its
deviation from the ideal functionality. The notion of universal
composability has been extended to the QKD setting [42,43].
Definition 1 [10,44,45]. A classical random variable K
(representing the key) drawn from the set K is said to be
-secure with respect to an eavesdropper holding a quantum
system E if
1
2 Tr|ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE|  , (1)
where ρKE =
∑
k∈K PK (k)|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρE|K=k is the state of the
systems K and E, PK (k) is the probability of having K = k,
ρU =
∑
k∈K |k〉〈k|/|K| represents an ideal key taking values
uniformly over K, and |K| is the size of K. Here, Tr|A| =∑
i |λi |, where λi’s are the eigenvalues of A.
QKD expands a shorter secret key to a longer one. When
one round of QKD that is 1-secure expands on a key generated
by a previous round of QKD that is 2-secure, the composition
of the two rounds is (1 + 2)-secure [43].
C. Additive functions
In this paper, we consider PA functions that are additive.
A function f : GF(q)N → GF(q)NPA is said to be additive
if f (a + b) = f (a) + f (b) for all a,b ∈ GF(q)N and the
addition operators are defined in the respective fields. For
prime q, the function f is additive if and only if it can be
expressed in the form of matrix multiplication f (a) = Aa,
where addition and multiplication are defined in GF(q). The
“if” part of this statement is obvious. To prove the “only if”
part, note that additivity implies linearity when q is prime since
every a ∈ GF(q)N can be expressed as a pure summation of
unweighted basis vectors of some basis (e.g., a weighting of 2
is broken down into a sum of two terms as in a = 2v = v + v,
with v being a basis vector) and f (a) = ∑Ni=1 f (a[i]vi) =∑
i a[i]f (vi), where vi’s are the basis vectors. Thus, the
columns of A are f (vi)’s.
We work in GF(2) throughout the paper and so q = 2 and
we can always consider PA functions of the form f (a) = Aa.
For q = pr being a power of a prime, we can also restrict
additive f to be of the same form in the following sense. We
may view GF(q) as a vector space over its subfield GF(p), since
any element of GF(q) can be written in the form ∑ri=1 γiβi ,
where γi ∈ GF(p), βi ∈ GF(q), and βi cannot be expressed in
the form γβj for j 	= i and some γ ∈ GF(p). This means that
an element of GF(q) can be represented as a length-r vector
with elements γi . Thus, when we express the PA function in the
prime field so that f : GF(p)rN → GF(p)rNPA , the statement
that f is additive if and only if f (a) = Aa for all a ∈ GF(p)rN
also holds. Of course, this does not mean that f can be
expressed as Aa for all a ∈ GF(pr )N .
Note that the number of additive PA functions grows
exponentially as N increases. This makes Eve’s job to attack a
key distribution scheme more difficult with larger N as she has
to make guesses on the PA function to be used by Alice and
Bob in order to customize her attack. Also, additivity is not
a very strong constraint and additive functions are commonly
used. For example, in Toeplitz-matrix-based PA [22,23,46,47],
the PA function f (a) = Aa is additive where A is a Toeplitz
matrix.
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A property of an additive function f is that any image of f
is a translation of the kernel by some offset. This means that
the number of elements in every image is the same. We use
this property in the proof of Theorem 1.
III. DELAYED PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Suppose Alice has an N -bit raw key a on which Eve has
some information. The raw key, which may not be completely
secure, can be turned into a shorter secure final key by applying
PA. Bob initially holds an N -bit raw key b which is a noisy
version of a and, for the current discussion of delayed PA, we
assume that Bob can correct all errors so that he also holds
a. We denote the function chosen by Alice and Bob for PA
as f (mapping N bits to NPA < N bits) and the secure key
shared between Alice and Bob as f (a). Normally, to encrypt
an NPA-bit message m′, Alice computes f (a) ⊕ m′ and sends
it to Bob. Bob can recover the original message m′ by XORing2
the encrypted message with the shared key f (a) [see Fig. 3].
Eve, in the middle of Alice and Bob, can see the encrypted
message f (a) ⊕ m′, but cannot get information on the original
message m′ because she does not know f (a).
In a delayed PA scheme, Alice expands the original message
m′ to m for encryption with the pre-PA key a. We call the
expanded message m the PA inverse of m′. To do this securely,
as we show below, Alice should choose m (an N -bit string)
uniformly among all strings that satisfy m′ = f ( m). Alice then
sends a ⊕ m to Bob [see Fig. 4]. We demand that f be additive.
Thus, anyone who receives this string can apply f to get
f (a ⊕ m) = f (a) ⊕ m′, which is the encrypted message sent
in the normal OTP situation. In particular, Bob can recover the
original message by applying f and XORing with the shared
key f (a). Alternatively, Bob can recover the original message
by XORing the received data with the pre-PA key a and applying
f . The security of the original message m′ is not obvious, as
Eve sees a ⊕ m in this delayed PA scheme, not f (a ⊕ m) in the
normal OTP scheme. Nevertheless, we show in the following
theorem that the security of the delayed PA scheme is identical
to that of the normal OTP scheme.
Theorem 1 (Security of delayed PA). Given an additive
function f that maps an N -bit string to an NPA-bit string
and that the final key f (a) for some a is -secure against
Eve according to security Definition 1, then, for some NPA-bit
message m′ chosen independently of a, m′ is -secure against
Eve (i.e., with the same security level) when she sees a ⊕ m,
where m is uniformly chosen among all strings that satisfy
m′ = f ( m).
Proof. Due to the security of the OTP, m′ is secure when
Eve sees f (a) ⊕ m′. Starting with this condition, we convert
it to the final condition claimed in the theorem. Let f −1[α] be
the inverse image of α under f . Thus, Eve seeing f (a) ⊕ m′
is effectively the same as Eve seeing f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′] since
Eve knows f and thus can compute the former given the latter
and vice versa. First note that f −1[α] has 2N−NPA elements
2Exclusive OR (XOR), denoted by ⊕, is an operation on two bits,
such that i ⊕ j = 0 if both i = j and i ⊕ j = 1 otherwise. XOR can
be extended to become an operation on two bit-strings by XORing
each bit pair independently.
irrespective of α. This is because f is additive and has the form
f (a) = Aa, where A is an NPA × N matrix. So, every inverse
image is in fact an affine subspace that can be translated to the
kernel of f by an offset. Hence, all inverse images f −1[α] for
all α have the same number of elements.3 This is important
since this allows us to use a random variable v independent of
α to select an element in the set f −1[α]. The variable v has a
fixed range and is drawn uniformly.
As the final part of the argument, note that giving Eve a
random element of f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′] chosen according to v
is equivalent to Eve seeing all the elements of f −1[f (a) ⊕
m′] and v. Since v is independent of the elements of
f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′], knowing v gives Eve no extra information
about f (a) or m′ over what knowing f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′] gives.
Thus, from Eve’s point of view, seeing a random element of
the set f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′] is equivalent to seeing the whole set.
Choosing s uniformly in f −1[f (a) ⊕ m′] means choosing s
uniformly such that f (s) = f (a) ⊕ m′ or f (s ⊕ a) = m′. By
defining m = s ⊕ a, we arrive at the claim of the theorem. 
Remark 1. We note that delaying PA does not affect the
security and the key generation length. The reason is as
follows. Theorem 1 proves that the same security level is
achieved by delaying PA with the same PA function. Since the
PA function defines the final key length, the key generation
length is not affected.
A. Special messages
We note the following special cases.
(i) Random message. If the original message m′ is also
uniformly chosen (acting as a key), m can be uniformly chosen
without regard to the condition m′ = f ( m).
(ii) Imperfect key as message. If the original message m′ is
an imperfect key, we can delay the PA of it together with a.
For instance, suppose that m′ = g( a′) is secure after applying
the PA function g to the insecure key a′. Then, the encrypting
party can send a ⊕ m, where m is uniformly chosen among all
strings that satisfy g( a′) = f ( m).
B. Computation of the PA inverse
To apply the delayed PA scheme, given the original
message m′, Alice needs to compute its inverse by choosing m
uniformly among all strings that satisfy m′ = f ( m). Here, we
offer a method that Alice can use to compute the PA inverse
m. Note that this is one possible method, there may be other
methods with different efficiencies to perform the same task.
Our method goes as follows. Since f is imposed to be
additive, it can be represented by a matrix multiplication in
GF(2), the finite field of two elements:
m′ = f ( m) = A m, (2)
where A is an NPA × N matrix with entries in GF(2).
Multiplication of two elements is AND,4 while addition is XOR.
3Sec. III B describes the computation off −1[α] and shows explicitly
how to find the 2N−NPA elements for a given α.
4AND is an operation on two bits such that i AND j = 1 only when
i = j = 1.
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We assume that the rows of A are linearly independent.
Thus, we can apply row operations (XOR of two rows) based
on Gaussian elimination to express A in upper triangular form:
A = R
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∗ ∗ · · · · · · · · · · · · ∗
0 ∗ · · · · · · · · · · · · ∗
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 ∗ · · · · · · ∗
0 · · · 0 0 ∗ · · · ∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦, (3)
where the last row has NPA − 1 zeros at the beginning and
R is an NPA × NPA matrix representing the row operations
with RR = I . Thus, given R m′, we can find m by randomly
choosing the last N − NPA elements of m and successively
determining the remaining elements of m by using the
triangular structure.
C. Example usage: A simple relay
Suppose Bob and Charlie want to establish a secret key, but
they do not have a direct quantum link with each other. Instead,
Bob has a quantum link with Alice (a relay) who has already
shared a huge supply (denoted as pool P) of perfectly secure5
key bits with Charlie. Normally, Alice and Bob would run
BB84 to generate from an N -bit raw key a an NPA < N -bit
final key f (a). With this key, Alice can OTP-encrypt NPA
bits from pool P and send the cipher text f (a) ⊕ m′ to Bob,
where m′ denotes the bits from the pool. Bob then recovers the
confidential message m′ that Charlie knows and this completes
the task of sharing a key between Bob and Charlie through
Alice. If the key f (a) is -secure against Eve according to
the universally composable definition in Definition 1, the
originally perfectly secure key m′ now becomes -secure.
Suppose that the costs of classical communication, compu-
tation, and/or energy of Alice are high. PA can be costly in
these aspects. In particular, performing PA requires one party
to transmit the full specification of the PA function f (·) to
the other party. For example, Toeplitz-matrix-based PA needs
N + NPA − 1 bits to specify [22,23,46,47], which can be a
big number when the block size is large. Also, performing
Toeplitz-matrix-based PA requires large matrix multiplication,
which translates to large computation and energy needs. These
can be costly for a satellite relay, for example. In order to
reduce these costs, Alice and Bob can delay PA and turn it over
to Bob and Charlie. To illustrate the idea of delayed PA, we
assume for simplicity that bit and phase error testing and error
correction are performed between Alice and Bob as normal.
Based on the phase error rate, Bob as in the normal situation
decides a particular PA function f . But instead of telling Alice
about f , Bob tells Charlie about it. Now, with delayed PA,
Alice can take N bits from pool P and directly OTP-encrypt
them with the raw key a. This N -bit cipher text a ⊕ m is
transmitted to Bob, where m denotes the N bits from the pool.
Bob recovers m, which Charlie knows. Both Bob and Charlie
apply PA f to share a final secret key f ( m), which has length
NPA and is -secure according to Theorem 1. This generates
5We assume for simplicity that the perfectly secure key is estab-
lished by face-to-face key exchange.
⊕
→ →
→ →
→→→
→
⊕ →→
(a)
→
⊕
→
→→ →
→
→ → → →
⊕ →→
(b)
FIG. 1. Overview of delayed PA. The message m′ is secure in both
situations, even though Eve sees different strings in the OTP channel.
We show in Theorem 1 that security is not affected by whether Eve
sees f (a) ⊕ m′ or a ⊕ m. Here, f is the PA function which shortens
its input and the arrow of the BB84 channel indicates the direction
of the qubits. (a)BB84 with normal PA and OTP. (b)BB84 with PA
delayed after the OTP. m can be regarded as the expanded version of
the secret message m′.
the same key as in the normal situation without delayed PA.
Note that, in this example, we sacrifice more key bits between
Alice and Charlie to save the communication, computation,
and/or energy costs of Alice.
IV. TWO-WAY DQKD PROTOCOL
Figure 2 illustrates the two-way deterministic QKD proto-
col we consider in this paper, which we call Protocol DQKD.
The steps of Protocol DQKD are as follows. Note that here
and in the rest of paper, we present protocols in the context of
Koashi’s security analysis [12] in which preshared secret keys
are used for encrypted communications of error correction
information. However, paradigms of other security analyses
[6–9] are applicable as well.
(1) Qubit transmission. Bob sends qubits to Alice taken in
{|0z〉,|1z〉,|0x〉,|1x〉} on line B-to-A.
(2) Encoding. For each qubit received by Alice, she either
measures it with a random basis (check mode) or applies a
random operation to it before returning it to Bob via line
A-to-B (encoding mode). We call the qubit in the check mode
a test bit and in the encoding mode a code bit. The operation
032308-4
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{I, X, Y, Z} 
〉 〉
〉 〉
Mw 
FIG. 2. Protocol DQKD. Bob chooses one of the four qubit states
to send to Alice on the forward channel. She applies one of the four
operations to encode her key bit and returns the qubit to Bob on the
backward channel. Bob measures the received qubit in the basis he
originally used for the forward qubit. The value of Alice’s key bit
depends on Bob’s basis (see Table I).
she applies in the encoding mode is I , X, Y , or Z chosen with
uniform probabilities. It does not matter whether she returns a
qubit to Bob via line A-to-B in the check mode.
(3) Measurement by Bob. Bob measures each qubit received
on line A-to-B in the same basis as the one he used for the
state he sent to Alice on line B-to-A in Step 1.
(4) Channel estimation. After transmission of all qubits,
Alice and Bob estimate the bit error rate eb and phase error
rate ep of line B-to-A using the test bits measured in check
mode in Step 2. They can do this by comparing their bit values
of those qubits that Alice measured with consistent bases.
(5) Key reconciliation. Bob announces to Alice the basis
used for each code bit. Alice constructs her key bit value based
on the basis (see Table I): when the basis is x, the key bit is 0
(1) if she applied I or X (Z or Y ); when the basis is z, the key
bit is 0 (1) if she applied I or Z (X or Y ). Bob uses the same
rule to decide the key bit value. Note that Alice and Bob do
not discard any code bit. There is no basis reconciliation step.
(6) Key bit error testing. Alice and Bob test for the error
rate eb in the key bits by comparing a subset of them. The
remaining key bits form their raw keys, a for Alice and b for
Bob. We denote the length of them by N .
(7) Final key generation. Alice and Bob choose a PA
function f (·) that is additive and maps N bits to NPA =
N [1 − h(ep)] bits. Alice applies PA to her raw key a to obtain
the final key k = f (a). She sends Bob Nh(eb ) bits of error
correction information encrypted with preshared secret bits.
This allows Bob to correct his raw key b to match Alice’s a.
Bob then applies PA to get the same final key k.
TABLE I. Key bit value dependence on the basis used by Bob (x
or z) and Alice’s encoding operation (I , X, Y , or Z). For example,
when Bob uses basis z, bit 1 is encoded by Alice if she applies X or
Y on the qubit sent by Bob.
Bit value
Basis 0 1
x {I,X} {Z,Y }
z {I,Z} {X,Y }
The net key expansion length is
Nkey,two−way = N [1 − h(eb ) − h(ep)]. (4)
In Sec. V B, we show that the newly generated key with length
NPA is secure, and thus the net key gain given in Eq. (4) is
achievable. We prove this by combining the BB84 protocol
and the OTP protocol and then successively converting the
OTP protocol to finally form the two-way DQKD protocol
given here.
An interesting feature of two-way DQKD protocol is that
every code bit encoded by Alice in the encoding mode is
used for the final key generation without being wasted due to
measurement basis mismatch. There is no basis reconciliation
for the key bits and this is why the protocol is called
deterministic.6 This is in contrast to the original BB84 protocol
where half of the code bits are discarded. On the other hand,
the efficient BB84 protocol [48] allows all code bits to be used
as well, but only asymptotically. Therefore, in finite-length
situations, two-way DQKD is still more efficient in using the
code bits.
Note that the test bits in the check mode of two-way DQKD
are measured by Alice with a random basis and thus are subject
to discarding due to basis mismatch. Thus, the check mode
performances are the same in two-way DQKD and BB84.
A disadvantage of two-way DQKD is that the quantum
signals emitted by Bob suffer from twice the channel loss
compared to BB84.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF TWO-WAY DQKD
The security proof of the two-way DQKD protocol is
based on arguing for the equivalence of the protocol with an
integrated scheme, and thus the security of the former directly
follows from that of the latter. The integrated scheme consists
of the BB84 protocol on the forward line and the one-time
pad on the backward line. The security of both are well
established [6–10,12,28]. Starting with the integrated scheme
in Sec. V A, we convert it to the two-way DQKD protocol in
Sec. V B.
A. Original protocols for constructing two-way DQKD
Here, we outline the steps of the BB84 protocol and the OTP,
which serve as the starting point of the conversion process.
1. Protocol 1 on line B-to-A: BB84 with quantum memory
We can view the line from Bob to Alice as a BB84 key
distillation step. The steps of BB84 are shown below, where
6Note that the term deterministic was first introduced in Ref. [30] to
mean that, when Alice wants to send 0 (or 1) to Bob, she can encode
her bit definitely. This makes sense in quantum direct communication,
but not in QKD. We apply this term to the QKD setting but only use
it to mean that every code bit will be used to generate the final key,
instead of that every code bit is the final key bit. This is because
Alice and Bob need to run PA which is determined only after Alice
has encoded all the raw key bits. Privacy amplification will then turn
Alice’s raw key bits into a new bit string that is different from what
she initially sent.
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we assume for simplicity the use of quantum memory to avoid
the step of discarding bits measured with inconsistent bases.
(1) Bob sends N + Ntest qubits to Alice taken in
{|0z〉,|1z〉,|0x〉,|1x〉}.
(2) Alice stores all N + Ntest received qubits in quantum
memory.
(3) Bob announces the basis of each qubit, and Alice
measures her qubits in the corresponding bases.
(4) Alice and Bob randomly select Ntest test bits to find out
the bit error rate eb and phase error rate ep for this line B-to-A.7
Alice and Bob choose a PA function f (·) that is additive and
maps N bits to NPA = N [1 − h(ep)] bits.
(5) The final secret key is derived from Alice’s raw key as an
NPA-bit string k = f (a). To allow Bob to obtain the same final
key, Alice sends Bob NEC = Nh(eb) bits of error correction
information encrypted with preshared secret bits of the same
size so that Bob can correct his raw key b to become a. He
then applies the same PA function f (·) to get the final key k.
Now, according to Koashi’s security proof of the BB84
protocol [12] (see also other proofs [6–9]), the final key k is
secure against Eve with the the net key expansion length as
Nkey = NPA − NEC = N [1 − h(eb) − h(ep)]. (5)
2. Protocol 2 on line A-to-B: One-time pad
We can view the line from Alice to Bob as a one-time pad
encryption step.
(6) Alice encrypts an NPA-bit message f ( m) with the secret
key k with the OTP and sends the encrypted message f ( m) ⊕ k
to Bob over a classical channel. (As we will see later, m will
be chosen randomly with uniform probabilities.)
(7) Bob decrypts his received data with key k to get the
secret message f ( m).
Here, Eve sees f ( m) ⊕ k on line A-to-B and the message
f ( m) is secure against her because of the security of the
OTP [28].
B. Conversion from original protocol
We successively convert the original Protocol 2 to new
Protocols 2b, 2c, and 2d, while maintaining the same security
in each step to finally arrive at the two-way DQKD protocol.
Figure 3 shows the equivalent protocols and they are described
in more detail in the following.
7The average quantum bit and phase error rates eb and ep are related
to the classical bit error rates in the x basis test bits and the z basis test
bits, denoted as ex and ez, respectively. Asymptotically, the quantum
bit error rate and the phase error rate for the remaining x (z) basis bits
are ex and ez, respectively (ez and ex , respectively). Thus, the average
quantum bit error rate is eb = (ex + ez)/2 and the average quantum
phase error rate is eb = (ez + ex)/2. Even though they are the same,
we use separate symbols for them to emphasize their meanings in
secret key distillation.
〉 〉
〉 〉 Mw ⊕
⊕⊕
(a)
〉 〉
〉 〉
Mw
Mw ⊕
⊕ 〉⊕
(b)
〉 〉
〉 〉
Mw 
⊕
⊕
X 
Z 
(c)
FIG. 3. (Color online) Protocols 2b, 2c, and 2d are equivalent.
The equivalence between Protocols 2c and 2d can be understood
intuitively by noting that both a measurement and a depolarizing
operation disentangle line B-to-A and line A-to-B. This is rigorously
shown by comparing their density matrices in Eq. (6) of Protocol
2c and Eqs. (8) and (9) of Protocol 2d. We identify the message bit
m1 (m2) of Protocol 2d with m of Protocol 2c when w = z (w = x).
Thus, Protocol 2d requires Bob to inform his basis w to Alice so that
she knows whether m1 or m2 is used for the final key generation. In
all cases, privacy amplification f is delayed after the OTP to generate
the final secret key f ( m), and the top part of each figure is Protocol 1.
Here, we assume for simplicity that the backward line A-to-B is
noiseless, but noise can be incorporated easily (see Sec. V C). QC,
quantum channel; CC, classical channel.
1. Protocol 2b on line A-to-B: One-time pad with delayed PA
(6) Alice encrypts an N -bit random message m with her
raw key a with one-time pad and sends the encrypted message
m ⊕ a to Bob over a classical channel line A-to-B.
(7) Bob recovers the secret message f ( m) as follows. He
applies PA to his received bits to get f ( m ⊕ a). Due to
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the additivity of f (·), his received data are f ( m) ⊕ f (a) =
f ( m) ⊕ k which he can decrypt with the same key k to recover
the messagef ( m). Alternatively, he can XOR his received string
m ⊕ a with the raw key a and apply PA f to recover the
message f ( m).
Here, Eve sees m ⊕ a and this is different from the situation
in Protocol 2. Nevertheless, as we have shown in Theorem 1,
the security of f ( m) is the same as that in Protocol 2, meaning
that Eve cannot get any information about f ( m).
2. Protocol 2c on line A-to-B: One-time pad on quantum channel,
with measurement
Line A-to-B is now regarded as a quantum channel, even
though we use it for the communication of the classical OTP-
encrypted message. We encode the OTP-encrypted classical
message in Step 6 of Protocol 2b m ⊕ a in a quantum state
so that it can be carried by the quantum channel. This is
easily done by encoding each bit in the eigenstate of some
basis. Here, we assume that the basis used is the same basis
w ∈ {x,z} Bob used to encode his qubit on line B-to-A.
Also, we assume for simplicity that Alice knows w for each
bit. Thus, the N -qubit state Alice sends is |( m ⊕ a) w〉 ≡⊗
i |(m[i] ⊕ a[i])w[i]〉, where the index i denotes the ith bit
for the message, key, and basis. The modified steps are as
follows.
(6) Alice encrypts an N -bit random message m with the raw
key a with the one-time pad and sends the encrypted message
|( m ⊕ a) w〉 to Bob over the quantum channel line A-to-B.
(7) Bob measures the N qubits received from line A-to-B
in basis w to recover the OTP-encrypted message m ⊕ a. He
recovers the secret message f ( m) as in Step 7 of Protocol 2b.
Overall density matrix. We first consider the state |	[i]〉A ¯A
for the ith bit shared after Alice received her N qubits from line
B-to-A (where system A is the ith qubit received by Alice on
line B-to-A and system ¯A includes all the remaining systems
including Eve’s and Bob’s states for the N transmissions and
Alice’s remainingN − 1 qubits). To simplify notation, we drop
the index i from all symbols (including |	[i]〉, w[i], and a[i])
in the following since we always deal with the ith qubit. This
state |	〉 is the state before Alice decides to send anything on
line A-to-B. In Protocol 2c, Alice measures her state of A in
basis w ∈ {x,z} using the projection {|0w〉〈0w|,|1w〉〈1w|}. So
the overall state becomes
∑
a=0,1 |aw〉A|	(a,w)〉 ¯A|a〉A′ , where|	(a,w)〉
¯A ≡ 〈aw|A ⊗ I ¯A|	〉A ¯A and system A′ is the ancilla
for storing the measurement result. We specifically isolate the
raw key bit a in system A′ so that we can use it to perform the
OTP with the message bit m. Next, Alice prepares a random
message 2−1
∑
m=0,1 |m〉M〈m| and runs controlled-Z (if w =
x) or controlled-X (if w = z) on systems M (as control) and
A. This is equivalent to the OTP encryption resulting in the
overall density matrix
ρMA ¯AA′ =
1
2
∑
m=0,1
|m〉M〈m|
⊗P
(∑
a=0,1
|(m ⊕ a)w〉A|	(a,w)〉 ¯A|a〉A′
)
,
in which system A is sent by Alice on line A-to-B to Bob and
system M is her message bit.
After the OTP encryption, the raw key bit a is no longer
needed. Thus, we trace over system A′ to get the overall state
ρMA ¯A =
1
2
∑
a = 0,1
m = 0,1
P (|m〉M |(m ⊕ a)w〉A|	(a,w)〉 ¯A). (6)
Note that tracing over system A′ which contains the raw key
bit does not mean giving the raw key bit to Eve. Eve’s state
is contained in system ¯A. The state in Eq. (6) is important
for our discussion since it contains all the relevant systems in
the protocol. In fact, Protocol 2d in the next section will be
shown to be equivalent to Protocol 2c here by showing that the
corresponding states there are the same as those in Eq. (6).
3. Protocol 2d on line A-to-B: One-time pad on quantum
channel, without measurement
In the previous Protocol 2c, the measurement by Alice
disentangles line B-to-A and line A-to-B. Therefore, to come
up with an equivalent protocol without a measurement, we
need to reproduce this disentanglement feature and at the same
time achieve the same overall state in Eq. (6). One way to do
this is by replacing the measurement by a depolarizing channel.
Starting with the same initial state |	〉A ¯A for the ith bit as in the
previous subsection, Alice performs randomly with uniform
probabilities the operations I , X, Y , or Z on each of her N
qubits independently. We express this random operation as
Alice using a mixed state 4−1
∑
m1,m2=0,1 |m1m2〉M1M2〈m1m2|
to control the four operations on system A:
|	〉A ¯A〈	| →
1
4
∑
m1,m2=0,1
|m1m2〉M1M2〈m1m2|
⊗ (Xm1Zm2 )A|	〉A ¯A〈	|(Zm2Xm1 )A (7)
Here, we assume Alice holds the purification of this mixed
state. Tracing the right-hand side over M1 or M2, simple
calculations (see the Appendix) lead to
ρM1A ¯A =
1
2
∑
a = 0,1
m1 = 0,1
P (|m1〉M1 |(m1 ⊕ a)z〉A|	(a,z)〉 ¯A), (8)
ρM2A ¯A =
1
2
∑
a = 0,1
m2 = 0,1
P (|m2〉M2 |(m2 ⊕ a)x〉A|	(a,x)〉 ¯A). (9)
Note that Eqs. (8) and (9) are expressed in terms of bases z
and x, respectively, regardless of the actual basis w used by
Bob to encode system A.
We argue that Protocol 2c and Protocol 2d are the same as
follows. Equations (8) and (9) represent the final overall state
of Protocol 2d and we compare them to that of Protocol 2c in
Eq. (6). We can see that when w = z (w = x), we can identify
m1 in Eq. (8) [Eq. (9)] with m in Eq. (6). Thus, when w = z
(w = x), we can regard that Alice’s message bit is in m1 (m2).
Once the basis w is publicly announced by Bob, all of Alice,
Bob, and Eve will know whether m1 or m2 will be used by
Alice; in other words, they will know which of Eqs. (8) and (9)
describes the situation. Therefore, Protocol 2c and Protocol 2d
are the same from Eve’s and Bob’s points of view.
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In Protocol 2d, we need a step for Bob to inform Alice
about w so that she knows whether m1 or m2 is her message
bit. Note that when Alice performs one of the four operations of
the depolarizing channel, she does not know what the message
bit value is (unless m1 = m2). After Bob receives his qubit,
he announces to Alice his basis choice w and only then does
Alice know the value of her own message bit.
The modified steps of Protocol 2d are as follows.
(6) Alice chooses two N -bit random messages, m1 and m2.
For each qubit received from line B-to-A, she applies Z if
m2 = 1 and applies X if m1 = 1.8 The qubit is then forwarded
back to Bob via line A-to-B.
(7) Bob measures the N qubits received from line A-to-B
in basis w which he has used in Step 1.
(8) Bob announces to Alice the basis for each qubit. If
the basis is z (x), Alice’s message bit is m1 (m2). So in the
previous step, Bob’s measured qubit corresponds to Alice’s
OTP-encrypted message bit m1 ⊕ a (for w = z) or m2 ⊕ a
(for w = x). He recovers the secret message f ( m) as in Step
7 of Protocol 2b, with the appropriate substitution m1 → m or
m2 → m for each bit. Alice also constructs the secret message
f ( m) with the same substitution.
Therefore, when line A-to-B is noiseless, Alice and Bob
will share the message bit m1 (for w = z) or m2 (for w = x).
When line A-to-B is noisy, we can add further error testing and
error correction for m, which we have omitted for simplicity
of discussion. Finally, we note that combining Protocol 1
and Protocol 2d essentially gives Protocol DQKD given in
Sec. IV.9 Thus, we have proved the security of Protocol
DQKD.
We remark that it makes sense that Alice’s message bit
depends on the basis used by Bob. Because when Bob initially
sends, for example, a z eigenstate to Alice via line B-to-A,
only Alice’s X operation (controlled by m1) will bit flip the
state, and so m1 should become her message bit.
C. Key generation rates
In Protocols 2, 2b, 2c, and 2d, we assume that the final key
is derived from applying PA to Alice’s raw key: k = f (a).
Bob is responsible for correcting his raw key to match
Alice’s. To ensure security, Alice’s message m is shortened
to NPA = N [1 − h(ep)] bits of secure message f ( m), where
ep is obtained from Step 4 of Protocol 1. In the discussion
so far, we have not considered errors on line A-to-B. Errors
on line B-to-A cause Alice’s raw key to be different from
Bob’s raw key such that b = a ⊕ e1, where e1 is the error
pattern with an error rate of eb (cf. Step 4 of Protocol 1).
Errors on line A-to-B cause Bob to receive m ⊕ a ⊕ e2 in
Step 6 of Protocol 2b, where e2 is the error pattern on this
line and could be correlated with e1. Thus, when Bob usesb to decrypt his message received on line A-to-B, he faces
8Note that the order of applications of these two operations does not
matter in light of Eq. (7) as swapping the order contributes a factor
of −1 twice.
9The key bit error testing of Step 6 of Protocol DQKD is omitted
in Protocol 2d for simplicity of discussion, but this step can easily be
added without affecting the result.
the error pattern e1 ⊕ e2, whose error rate we denote as eb .
To help Bob correct for this error pattern, Alice sends to Bob
error correction information encrypted with N (eb ) bits of
the preshared secret key. Therefore, the net key expansion
length is
Nkey,two−way = N [1 − h(eb ) − h(ep)]. (10)
This represents the key generation rate for the integration of
Protocol 1 and any of Protocols 2, 2b, 2c, and 2d. As expected,
this is the same formula for the two-way DQKD protocol given
in Eq. (4). As a special case, when the error rates on the two
lines are both eb, the overall error rate eb is upper-bounded by
2eb since the errors on the two lines can be correlated. Thus, the
key generation rate in this case is 1 − h(2eb) − h(ep), which is
the same as that derived for another two-way DQKD protocol
in Ref. [40] (see Sec. III F therein).
Note that as Alice and Bob are correcting the overall error
pattern e1 ⊕ e2, they do not need to separately correct for the
error e1 in their raw keys; i.e., they do not perform Step 5 of
Protocol 1. This is reflected in the original two-way DQKD
protocol in Sec. IV.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The central idea of our paper is delayed PA and we have
proved its security. Delayed PA is useful for secret key sharing
between nodes of a QKD network assisted by trusted relays
and for the security proof of a qubit-based two-way DQKD
protocol. We anticipate that delayed PA will have further uses
in other applications, such as the security proof of two-way
continuous-variable QKD [39].
In this paper, we derived the qubit-based two-way DQKD
protocol from an integration of the BB84 protocol and the OTP,
with the condition that PA is delayed after the OTP . Because
of our security proof of delayed PA, the original security of
BB84 directly carries over to the DQKD protocol. Thus, we
have proved the security of the DQKD protocol against general
attacks with qubit signals. This illustrates the power of the
delayed PA idea.
Security analysis of DQKD with multiqubit signals and
decoy states [49–51] is beyond the scope of the current paper
and will be left for future work. Also, using nonadditive PA
functions in delayed PA will be considered in the future.
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APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF EQ. (8) FROM EQ. (7)
We only derive Eq. (8) from Eq. (7). The deriva-
tion of Eq. (9) is similar. First, we decompose |	〉A ¯A =∑
i=0,1 λi |iz〉A|ei〉 ¯A, where |iz〉A are the normalized eigenstates
of basis z and |ei〉 ¯A are normalized but not necessarily
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orthogonal. We trace the state of Eq. (7) over M2:
ρM1A ¯A =
1
4
∑
m1=0,1
|m1〉M1〈m1| ⊗
[
P
(
X
m1
A |	〉A ¯A
) + P ((Xm1Z)A|	〉A ¯A)
]
= 1
4
|0〉M1〈0| ⊗ [P (λ0|0z〉A|e0〉 ¯A + λ1|1z〉A|e1〉 ¯A) + P (λ0|0z〉A|e0〉 ¯A − λ1|1z〉A|e1〉 ¯A)]
+1
4
|1〉M1〈1| ⊗ [P (λ0|1z〉A|e0〉 ¯A + λ1|0z〉A|e1〉 ¯A) + P (λ0|1z〉A|e0〉 ¯A − λ1|0z〉A|e1〉 ¯A)]
= |λ0|
2
2
[|0〉M1〈0| ⊗ |0z〉A〈0z| + |1〉M1〈1| ⊗ |1z〉A〈1z|]⊗ |e0〉 ¯A〈e0|
+|λ1|
2
2
[|0〉M1〈0| ⊗ |1z〉A〈1z| + |1〉M1〈1| ⊗ |0z〉A〈0z|]⊗ |e1〉 ¯A〈e1|.
The last equation is equal to Eq. (8) by noting that |	(k,z)〉
¯A ≡ 〈kz|A ⊗ I ¯A|	〉A ¯A = λk|ek〉 ¯A.
The derivation of Eq. (9) from Eq. (7) can be done in a similar manner by decomposing |	〉A ¯A in the x basis as |	〉A ¯A =∑
i=0,1 λ
′
i |ix〉A|e′i〉 ¯A.
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